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The Strategic Value of Compute Resources in the OpenAI–AMD Partnership

The expansion of generative AI has entered a stage where progress is determined not by model novelty but by the ability to secure and operate compute resources. The multi-year, multi-generation alliance between OpenAI and AMD clearly reflects this structure. It is no longer a simple transactional deal but a framework that integrates capital, supply, power, and implementation layers into a mechanism for mutual growth—signaling a shift toward scale as a built-in assumption.

Forecasting Power Demand

The backbone of this partnership is gigawatt-class compute capacity. An initial 1 GW, scaling to several gigawatts, links data-center construction directly to regional grid planning rather than individual projects. The key factors are not only peak power draw but sustained supply reliability and effective PUE including heat rejection. AI training workloads behave as constant loads rather than spikes, making grid stability and redundancy in auxiliary systems critical bottlenecks.

Model evolution continues to expand overall electricity demand, offsetting gains in performance per watt. Even as semiconductor generations improve efficiency, larger parameter counts, bigger datasets, and multimodal preprocessing and inference push consumption upward. Consequently, capital investment shifts its center of gravity from racks to civil-engineering and electrical domains that include cooling infrastructure.

Structural Issues in the Compute Market

Even with AMD expanding deployment options, the NVIDIA-dominated market faces other bottlenecks—optical interconnects, advanced HBM, and CoWoS packaging capacity among them. Rising rack-level heat density makes the shift from air to liquid cooling irreversible, tightening location constraints for data centers. The result is a conversion lag: capital cannot instantly be turned into usable compute capacity.

A further concern is geopolitical risk. Heightened global tensions and export controls can fragment manufacturing and deployment chains, triggering cascading delays and redesigns.

OpenAI’s Challenges

The first challenge for OpenAI is absorbing and smoothing exponentially growing compute demand. Running research, productization, and APIs concurrently complicates capacity planning across training and inference clusters, making the balance between model renewal and existing services a critical task.

The second is diversification away from a single vendor. Heavy reliance on NVIDIA has caused supply bottlenecks and eroded pricing flexibility. Sharing the roadmap with AMD therefore carries both optimization and procurement significance.

The third lies in capital structure and governance. While drawing in vast external commitments, OpenAI must maintain neutrality and research agility, requiring careful contract architecture to coordinate partnerships. The episode of its past internal split serves as a reminder: when capital providers bring divergent decision criteria, alignment of research agendas becomes a challenge.

AMD’s Challenges

AMD’s bottlenecks are manufacturing capacity and the software ecosystem. Its latest designs can compete technically, but to offer a developer experience rivaling the PyTorch/CUDA world, it must advance runtimes, compilers, kernels, and distributed-training toolchains. Hardware aspects such as HBM supply, packaging yield, and thermal management will define both delivery schedules and operational stability.

A second challenge is converting the co-developed results with OpenAI into broader market value. If collaboration remains confined to a single project or product, dependency risk increases. Generalizing and scaling the gains to other markets will be essential.

Strategic Intent of the Partnership

At the surface, the intent is clear: OpenAI seeks secure and diversified compute resources, while AMD seeks simultaneous credibility and demand. Structurally, however, there is a deeper layer—integrating models, data, compute, and capital into a unified flow; accelerating GPU design and supply cycles; and locking in diversified power and site portfolios early. In effect, both sides embed their respective challenges into a forward-loaded roadmap that reduces uncertainty in supply and financing.

Scheme Design

The distinctive feature is clause design that firmly enforces reciprocal commitment. Large take-or-pay volumes and facility milestones are tied to capital returns, linking hardware success directly to customer benefit. For suppliers, it secures quantity certainty and pricing floors, easing investment decisions. For buyers, it strengthens influence over technical specifications and workload fit. Financially, it helps smooth extreme swings in cash flow.

Difference from NVIDIA’s Model

Where NVIDIA’s massive deal channels capital from supplier to buyer—who then spends it back on the supplier—the AMD structure grants equity options from supplier to buyer, while the buyer guarantees long-term procurement. Both align incentives, but the direction of capital flow and degree of governance leverage differ.

NVIDIA’s model gives suppliers greater control and restricts buyers through capital conditions. AMD’s allows buyers to become future shareholders, giving them indirect influence over the supplier’s technical priorities.

Compute-ism

In the AI era, the value model ultimately converges on a single question: who can operate how much compute, on what power, at what efficiency, and under what governance. Partnerships with Microsoft, NVIDIA, AMD, and Oracle all stem from that premise. Compute capacity has become currency, conduit, and foundation of sovereignty. The choice of compute space—including power source, jurisdiction, ethical stance, and data lineage—extends from corporate strategy into institutional design.

From this viewpoint, true competitiveness lies in projects that integrate long-term cloud commitments, dedicated power and cooling, secured land, and supply-chain finance. Price or FLOPS comparisons alone no longer define advantage.

Impact on the Hardware and Technology Roadmap

Meeting the insatiable demand for compute requires clear priorities: larger memory space, lower latency, more efficient cooling, higher energy performance. GPUs will continue evolving accordingly—scaling HBM capacity and bandwidth, advancing interconnects, and optimizing storage and data-loading paths. Opportunities for improvement remain endless.

On the software side, the question is how close AMD’s compilers and runtimes can come to zero-friction while preserving backward compatibility with PyTorch and JAX. In an expanding market, feeding operational feedback into architecture along the shortest path will decide generational performance gaps. Even abundant hardware fails to convert into market value without matching software optimization.

Power, cooling, and site strategy should also be treated as integral parts of the roadmap. Layouts premised on liquid immersion, integration of heat recovery with district systems, hybridization of renewables and storage, and adaptive scheduling to power demand—all these “Watt and Bit” linkages define the real unit cost of compute. Chip miniaturization alone will not sustain the next decade.

Conclusion

The OpenAI–AMD partnership marks the arrival of an era where capital, supply, power, and software are designed as a single system around compute resources. Under compute-ism, victory depends not on individual products but on ecosystem maturity. Market velocity will accelerate, yet the fundamentals remain simple: which power, in which place, on which chip, through which code, under which governance. The alliances that design these layers early, deeply, and broadly will draw the next map of the AI age.

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The Structure of the New Resource War

In the era of AI, what is the most valuable resource? When I think about it, the first things that come to mind are “GPUs” and “data.”

At the same time, the idea that these are important resources has already become common sense. The real question is what kind of resources they are.

During the Industrial Revolution, oil was the resource that moved nations. It supported industrial production, transportation, and even determined the outcomes of wars. It was said that whoever controlled oil controlled the world.

Today, GPUs are beginning to resemble oil. They drive generative AI, support military technologies, and stand at the frontlines of information warfare. Whether or not a nation possesses computational resources now determines its strategic strength.

I wrote about this perspective in “The Geopolitics of Computational and Energy Resources.

However, the emergence of ChatGPT, and later DeepSeek, has made things a little more complicated. Having massive amounts of GPUs and data is no longer an absolute prerequisite. With the right model design and training strategy, it has been proven that even limited computational resources can produce disruptive results.

In other words, GPUs, once similar to oil, are now also beginning to resemble “currency.”

It’s not just about how much you have. It’s about where, when, and how you use it. Liquidity and strategic deployment determine outcomes. Mere accumulation is meaningless. Value is created by circulation and optimized utilization.

Given this, I believe the coming resource wars will have a two-layer structure.

One layer will resemble the traditional oil wars. Nations will hoard GPUs, dominate supply chains, and treat computational resources like hard currency.

The other layer will be more flexible and dynamic, akin to currency wars. Teams will compete on model design, data engineering, and chip architecture optimization—on how much performance they can extract from limited resources.

DeepSeek exemplified the second path. In an environment without access to cutting-edge GPUs, they optimized software and human resources to extract performance that rivals the world’s top models.

In short, simply possessing computational resources will no longer be enough. It will be essential to customize, optimize, and maximize the efficiency of what you have.

It’s not about “who has the most.” It’s about “who can use it best.”

I believe this is the structure of the new resource war in the AI era.

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Why Didn’t Google Build ChatGPT?

When OpenAI released ChatGPT, I believe the company that was most shocked was Google.

They had DeepMind. They had Demis Hassabis. By all accounts, Google had some of the best researchers in the world. So why couldn’t they build ChatGPT—or even release it?

Google also had more data than anyone else.
So why did that not help? Perhaps it was because they had too much big data—so much of it optimized for search and advertising that it became a liability in the new paradigm of language generation. Data that had once been a strategic asset was now too noisy, too structurally biased to be ideal for training modern AI.

Having a large amount of data is no longer the condition for innovation. Instead, what matters now is a small amount of critical data, and a team with a clear objective for the model’s output. That’s what makes today’s AI work.

That’s exactly what OpenAI demonstrated. In its early days, they didn’t have access to massive GPU clusters. Their partnership with Microsoft only came later, after GPT-3. They launched something that moved the world—with minimal resources, and a lot of design and training ingenuity. It wasn’t about quantity of data, but quality. Not about how much compute you had, but how you structured your model. That was the disruptive innovation.

And what did Big Tech do in response? They began buying up GPUs. To preempt competition. They secured more computing power than they could even use, just to prevent others from accessing it.

It was a logical move to block future disruptions before they could even begin. In language generation AI especially, platforms like Twitter and Facebook—where raw, unfiltered human expression is abundant—hold the most valuable data. These are spaces full of emotion, contradiction, and cultural nuance. Unlike LinkedIn, which reflects structured, formalized communication, these platforms capture what it means to be human.

That’s why the data war began. Twitter’s privatization wasn’t just a media shakeup. Although never explicitly stated, Twitter’s non-public data has reportedly been used in xAI’s LLM training. The acquisition likely aimed to keep that “emotional big data” away from competitors. Cutting off the API and changing domains was a visible consequence of that decision.

And just as Silicon Valley was closing in—hoarding data and GPUs—DeepSeek emerged from an entirely unexpected place.

A player from China, operating under constraints, choosing architectures that didn’t rely on cutting-edge chips, yet still managing to compete in performance. That was disruptive innovation in its purest form.

What Google had, OpenAI didn’t. What OpenAI had, Google didn’t. That difference now seems to signal the future shape of our digital world.

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